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Technological Adaptation in a Global Conflict: The British Army 
and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918 
 
Brian N. Hall 
 
 
Abstract 
This article seeks to contribute to recent scholarly analysis of 
the British Army’s military performance and its leadership’s 
willingness and ability to adapt during the First World War by 
examining a maligned, though vital, aspect of its command 
and control system, communications. It offers a comparative 
assessment of the development and contribution of 
communications to British operations beyond the Western 
Front and concludes that the army was, on the whole, 
remarkably successful at adapting its communications system 
to suit the demands of fighting a modern, global conflict. 
 
 
As the centenary of the First World War approaches, scholarly debate concerning the 
military performance of the British Army on the Western Front shows little sign of 
abating.
1
 One strand of the historiography that has come under particular scrutiny in 
recent years is the “learning curve” hypothesis. Generally speaking, supporters of the 
“learning curve” have used the term as a means of describing the process by which 
the British Army’s tactical and operational efficiency gradually improved during the 
course of the war. Challenging the long-held view that British generals were either 
“butchers and bunglers” or the victims of circumstances beyond their control, the 
notion of a “learning curve” suggests that commanders did learn important lessons 
with regards to the conduct of operations and subsequently implemented a variety of 
changes that resulted in improved battlefield performance, indicating a degree of 
institutional professionalism which previous historians had ignored.
2
 
Although it is a view that has undoubtedly aided our understanding of how, 
and to what extent, the British Army responded to the transformation of war between 
1914 and 1918, it would appear that the “learning curve” model has now run its 
 2 
course. Besides questioning the accuracy of the term “curve” to describe the army’s 
learning process and criticising the Anglo-centricity of the concept, prominent 
historians such as Hew Strachan and William Philpott have also begun urging British 
scholars of the First World War to look beyond the narrow confines of the Western 
Front and assess the conflict in its wider, global context.
3
 Although the Western Front 
was the main focus of its effort, any assessment of the British Army’s military 
performance during the war remains incomplete unless it takes into account the 
campaigns conducted in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East.
4
 Indeed, as David 
French has shown, during the interwar period the British General Staff sought to 
restructure and reorganise the army and rewrite its doctrine based not only on its 
experiences in France and Belgium but also from the lessons it had learnt from 
fighting in the extra-European theatres.
5
 
This article will attempt to make a modest contribution to this re-evaluation of 
the British Army’s military performance and its ability to adapt on a global scale 
during the First World War by focusing on a maligned, though vital, aspect of its 
command and control system, communications.
6
 This is a particularly fitting subject 
to re-assess for two key reasons. First, it has the potential to provide fresh insights 
into the on-going debate concerning the role of communications and information 
resources in warfare in general. Over the last three decades, dramatic advances in 
communications and information processing technology have led a number of 
commentators to speculate that the armed forces of several Western states are in the 
midst of an information-based Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
7
 Some 
historians have sought subsequently not only to uncover past examples of RMAs but 
also to assess the extent that these RMAs depended on their communications 
components.
8
 As yet, however, there has been no detailed and systematic exploration 
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of the role of communications and information resources in the British Army during 
the First World War, the conflict which, according to some historians, spawned the 
most important RMA to date.
9
 
The second key justification for re-examining this subject lies in the unique 
communications circumstances faced by all the armies during the war. As Gary 
Sheffield puts it: “The era of the First World War stands as the only period in history 
in which high commanders were mute.”10 The absence of suitable mobile, “real-time” 
communications imposed profound restrictions on the successful conduct of British 
operations on the Western Front. During the heat of battle, telephone and telegraph 
lines were destroyed by shellfire or accidently cut by cavalry and tanks; wireless sets 
were heavy, fragile and could only transmit information in Morse code; visual 
signalling via electric lamps, flags and heliograph was subject to interference from 
dust, smoke and poor weather conditions, as well as endangering the life of the 
signaller; and, message carriers, both human and non-human, were slow, vulnerable 
and unreliable. As the “Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War” in 
October 1932 made clear, the breakdown of communications was often accountable 
for “the general air of uncertainty and absence of command” which characterized 
nearly all of the British Army’s battles on the Western Front.11 
However, recent research has suggested that, although communications lay at 
the heart of the difficulties of waging war on the Western Front, they also played an 
important part in overcoming the superiority of the defence and the stalemate of 
trench warfare. Despite not having been prepared in 1914 for the difficulties of 
modern, industrial warfare, the British Army’s communications system did improve 
during the course of the war and made an important contribution to the successful 
combined-arms operations in the summer and autumn of 1918.
12
 The case of 
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communications highlights one area of the British Army’s willingness and ability to 
adapt successfully to the demands of modern war, seeking out new ideas, modifying 
existing practices and harnessing both the skills of its citizen soldiers and the full 
potential of the technologies at its disposal.
13
  
But how does this ability to adapt on the Western Front compare with the 
British Army’s communications experiences in the other, so-called “peripheral,” 
theatres? This is a question that has so far gone unanswered by historians and there 
appear to be two possible explanations for this. First, the seemingly technical 
complexity of communications has acted as a serious deterrent to historians wishing 
to undertake such a project. Paddy Griffith, for instance, described Raymond 
Priestley’s regimental history of the British Army’s Signal Service on the Western 
Front as “positively the most impenetrable book ever written on the war.”14 Secondly, 
the difficulty of obtaining reliable sources, both primary and secondary, has also acted 
as a major disincentive. Only one of the most senior officers of the Signal Service left 
any personal papers, correspondence or diaries relating to their wartime experiences.
15
 
Furthermore, of the three secondary works that do contain some detailed information 
on communications in the subsidiary theatres, Priestley’s The Signal Service in the 
War 1914 to 1918 (Salonika) and The Signal Service in the War 1914 to 1918 (East 
Africa) were never published,
16
 while the official history of the Royal Corps of 
Signals, published in 1958, was written by a former signals officer, Major-General 
Reginald Nalder, who, unsurprisingly, paints a rather over-optimistic picture of the 
work of the Signal Service during the war.
17
  
Despite these restrictions and the subsequent historiographical disregard for 
the subject, a comparative assessment of the way in which the British Army adapted 
its communications system to meet the demands imposed by the conditions that 
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existed in the various theatres in which it fought offers the real possibility of making 
more rounded and definitive judgements about the nature and development of British 
communications policy and practice during the First World War. In the process, it 
also sheds light on the British Army as an institution, particularly the extent to which 
the army displayed many of the characteristics of a “learning organization” – that is, 
“an organization which facilitates the learning of all its members and continuously 
transforms itself.”18 While mistakes and setbacks are “elemental features of 
development and learning,” it is “the way in which organizations respond” to 
challenges and “the lessons that are learnt from the experience” that qualifies them for 
the title “learning organization.”19 
This article seeks to fill this intriguing gap in the literature by making 
extensive use of British, American, Canadian and Australian sources, particularly the 
GHQ, army, corps and divisional signal company war diaries held at the National 
Archives in London, which have so far remained largely untouched by First World 
War historians. In addition, to compensate for the deficiency of personal papers 
belonging to senior Signal Service officers, not only have the private papers 
belonging to junior officers, NCOs and other ranks of the Signal Service been 
consulted, but also the private papers of a number of senior officers who were not 
attached to the Signal Service have been examined in the search for information 
pertaining to communications. Together, these sources will help provide answers to 
two key questions: first, how, and to what extent, did British communication practices 
in the peripheral theatres differ from those on the Western Front?; and, second, how 
well did the British Army adapt its communications system to meet the diverse array 
of challenges it faced in each of these theatres? In attempting to place the British 
Army’s communication experience during the First World War into some sort of 
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global comparative context, this article begins by briefly outlining the key features of 
the communication technologies and practices employed by the British Army on the 
Western Front. Five theatres of war will then be considered: Gallipoli; Mesopotamia; 
Egypt and Palestine; East Africa; and Macedonia. Examining each in turn, the article 
suggests that British communications practice during the war contained elements of 
both diversity and commonality, demonstrating that the army was, on the whole, 
remarkably successful at adapting its communications system to suit the demands of 
fighting a modern, global conflict. 
 
Communications Technology and the Western Front 
 Before examining the communication practices of British forces in the extra-
European theatres, it will first be necessary to provide a brief overview of the main 
communication technologies employed by the British Army during the war and how 
these shaped the nature of the communications system developed on the Western 
Front. According to Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations (1909), it was of the 
utmost importance that there existed “a constant maintenance of communication 
between the various parts of an army.” To this end, the efficiency of the army’s 
communications system depended on the “careful coordination and economical 
employment of the several means of intercommunication available.”20 Besides 
utilising an array of message carriers, including runners, despatch riders, liaison 
officers and carrier pigeons, and employing a range of visual signalling methods, such 
as heliograph, semaphore and electric lamps,
21
 the mainstay of the army’s 
communications system on the Western Front revolved around three, more modern 
means of communication: telegraphy, telephony and wireless. 
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 By the outbreak of the First World War the telegraph had firmly established 
itself as a standard method of communication within the British Army, particularly at 
the strategic and operational levels of command.
22
 Throughout the war, the strategic 
telegraph network, from the War Office and the Central Telegraph Office in London 
to the headquarters of the lines of communication on the Channel Ports, consisted of 
two double-current duplex circuits. A high-speed Wheatstone automatic system, 
consisting of double-current simplex circuits, operated along the lines of 
communication to GHQ and army headquarters. Double-current simplex circuits 
connected army and corps headquarters, while single-current simplex and buzzer 
circuits were the standard methods of telegraphy from corps to divisions and divisions 
to brigades.
23
 
The army utilised two types of line: “Airline” and “Cable.” The former 
referred to bare wire fixed to poles, buildings or trees, while the latter consisted of 
gutta-percha or rubber-insulated wire laid along the ground.
24
 Airline was the 
prominent feature of the telegraph and telephone system to the rear of divisional 
headquarters, beyond the range of enemy artillery fire. Lines forward of divisional 
headquarters were laid on short poles or stakes, along the sides or the bottom of 
trenches, or simply along the ground.
25
 However, the closer to the frontline the more 
susceptible to faults and breakages from enemy shellfire these lines became, not to 
mention their vulnerability to enemy interception. Throughout the war, the British 
Army implemented numerous measures to combat these problems, including twisting 
the cable to reduce “leakage,” duplicating the number of lines laid and burying them 
to ever-greater depths to protect them from shellfire.
26
 By the summer of 1915, the 
standardised depth of lines forward of divisional headquarters was 2 feet 6 inches. By 
the end of the year this had been deepened to 5 feet and by the start of the Somme 
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offensive in July 1916, all lines up to battalion headquarters were laid to a depth of 6 
feet.
27
 
 In contrast to the telegraph, upon the outbreak of the war British commanders 
had yet to fully appreciate the significant potential of the telephone.
28
 With the onset 
of trench stalemate in late 1914, however, the telephone quickly became the army’s 
principal means of communication. As a former brigade staff captain wrote after the 
war: “… a telephone wire was not only the outward sign of command, but the life-
blood of its existence. A general without a telephone was to all practical purposes 
impotent – a lay figure dressed in uniform, deprived of eyes, arms and ears.”29 The 
original D. Mark I and Mark II portable buzzer telephones, however, were too few in 
number and not very popular. Although they could be used for speaking and sending 
messages by Morse code,
30
 according to Colonel R.M. Powell, who commanded 2
nd
 
Division Signal Company in 1914: 
 
The hand telephone attachments were quite useless for any but 
short distances, and the only conversations between Division 
and Brigade consisted of “speaking over the key”, i.e., the 
Staff Officer dictated his conversation to the telegraph 
operator, who sent it by vibrator in Morse – the receiving 
operator “translating” it to the Staff Officer at the other end; a 
very slow and unsatisfactory process.
31
 
 
 
In late September 1914, British General Headquarters (GHQ) informed the War 
Office that the army ‘urgently required’ the supply of the new, more reliable and 
efficient D. Mark III telephone, which was a lot simpler to use and produced a better 
sound quality over longer distances.
32
 While the D. Mark III subsequently became the 
standard portable buzzing telephone set in service during the war, the huge demand 
for telephonic communication also ensured the supply of specially designed magneto 
telephones and switchboards.
33
 These magneto telephones were of two types: those of 
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“a semi-portable nature, providing first grade speaking and ringing facilities, and, at 
the same time, capable of ready transportation from point to point;” and those 
“designed for longer and more permanent connections established between the 
various headquarters, as well as for the scattered offices of the staff and 
administration officers.”34 
 Although the telephone quickly became the army’s most indispensable method 
of communication, its use was not without its drawbacks. Like the telegraph, its lines 
were extremely vulnerable to shellfire and to enemy interception. It was also ill-suited 
to the conditions of mobility and manoeuvre which characterised the operations of 
1918. As Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, GOC XVIII Corps, stated in May that 
year: “Officers must learn to discard the ‘telephone habit’ as soon as open warfare 
commences and concentrate on alternative methods of communication.”35 
Furthermore, while there was practically no limit to the operational range of the 
telegraph, telephones in the early twentieth century suffered from the problem of 
attenuation.
36
 As one signal officer noted after the war, “long distance telephony with 
the circuits then available was extremely capricious and in any case not suitable when 
secrecy was necessary.”37 
 The static nature of the fighting on the Western Front resulted in the 
development of an equally static, though increasingly elaborate, telecommunications 
network. This served the needs of the army relatively well so long as trench stalemate 
prevailed. Once troops clambered out of their trenches and ventured out into “no-
man’s-land” and beyond, however, telephones and telegraph became a liability. The 
communication difficulties that plagued British operations throughout the war were 
graphically illustrated at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, the army’s first 
major offensive under trench conditions.
38
 As one post-action report observed, 
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although “the commander can ensure that the general plan of attack is sound and that 
the troops start the attack knowing their tasks and objectives and well provided with 
all essentials,” once the battle has begun “control passes largely out of his hands 
except under exceptionally favourable circumstances.”39 Since it was almost not 
worth running out lines during the initial stages of an assault, “as they get cut before 
they can be of any practical use,”40 British commanders began experimenting with an 
alternative and more flexible means of communication: wireless. 
 Wireless technology was very much in its infancy in 1914. Like the early 
versions of computers and mobile telephones, wireless sets in the early twentieth 
century were large, heavy and unreliable.
41
 With the transmission of human speech 
over radio waves (wireless telephony) at an early, experimental stage,
42
 the wireless 
sets employed by the British Army during the war were “almost exclusively Morse-
operated with crystals or magnetized tape-detection for receivers, and arc or spark-gap 
radiation for transmission,”43 which meant that they were easily susceptible to 
damage, their operational range was limited and channel selectivity poor. Only a 
limited number of sets could be employed on a given frontage without risk of mutual 
interference and no portable, man-carried set existed for army purposes at the 
beginning of the war.
44
 
 Three main wireless sets were in use by the British Army in 1914: the motor 
lorry set, wagon set and pack set. Powered by a 1.5 kilowatt engine and comprising 
two 70-foot masts, the motor lorry set was carried within the confines of a lorry and 
had a range of approximately 100 miles. Wagon sets were also similarly powered, 
weighed over a ton and were equipped with an 80-foot mast, all drawn by four horses. 
Pack sets were lighter and thus more mobile, though four horses were still required to 
carry the transmitter, receiver, 0.5 kilowatt engine and two 30-foot masts. It took 
 11 
between 15 and 20 minutes to set up and had a range of approximately 30 miles.
45
 In 
light of their size, weight and technical shortcomings, only GHQ and the cavalry were 
furnished with wireless upon the outbreak of the war. GHQ possessed one motor lorry 
set and three wagon sets, while Cavalry Division headquarters was equipped with 
three wagon sets and each cavalry brigade provided with a standard pack set.
46
  
However, these sets proved ill-suited both to the mobile operations which 
characterised the fighting in 1914 and to the trench conditions that prevailed from the 
winter of 1914-15 onwards.
47
 In mid-1915, GHQ began looking at the possibility of 
developing lighter, portable wireless sets for use in the field. By the spring of 1917 
the army had developed, and was employing, three types of wireless apparatus: the 
British Field (BF) trench set, the Loop set and the Wilson set. The BF trench set, first 
introduced in 1916, had a range of approximately 4,000 yards, possessed a 
conspicuous 12-foot aerial and required six men to carry it and all its paraphernalia. 
The Loop set, which entered service in 1917, was lighter and its aerial was much less 
conspicuous. However, its range was limited to between 2,000 and 3,000 yards and its 
band of operating frequencies was so narrow that mutual interference prevented the 
set from being employed on a large scale. Wilson sets were employed chiefly at army, 
corps and divisional headquarters to monitor brigade and battalion wireless traffic. 
Their communication range with the BF trench set ranged from four to ten miles.
48
 
Although these sets added a great deal of flexibility to the British Army’s 
communications system, they all operated according to the principles of spark 
telegraphy, which meant that in the hostile environment that lay beyond brigade 
headquarters they were very unselective, easily damaged and were highly prone to 
mutual interference and jamming.
49
 To overcome these problems, from 1917 the army 
began employing continuous wave (CW) sets, which relied upon newly-developed 
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thermionic valves (or vacuum tube amplifiers) to generate shorter wavelengths, 
affording lighter wireless-telegraphy sets and a greater range of communication 
(6,000 yards) for much less power expenditure. Although the Germans never 
employed CW during the war, the limited number of sets available in the British 
Army in 1917-18 meant that CW wireless was restricted mainly to the artillery for 
counter-battery work.
50
 However, it proved very successful, as a report by the 
Assistant Director of Signals (AD Signals), Canadian Corps, noted in August 1918: 
“… it had been proved that flash spotting by [CW] Wireless is not only possible, but 
that better results can be obtained than by the use of telephone.”51 
Thus, although Dennis Showalter is correct when he argues that by the 
summer of 1918 the British Army on the Western Front possessed “a tactical 
communication system that by then was generally adequate to coordinate the 
movements of semi mechanized armies in semi mobile operations,”52 tenuous 
communications were still having a profound impact on its operations.
53
 During the 
Battle of Epéhy on 18 September, for instance, the breakdown of telegraphic, 
telephonic and wireless communication meant that communications forward of 
divisional headquarters were completely reliant upon a slow service of runners. 
Consequently, “it was hours after events had happened at the front that they became 
known to divisional headquarters, and the direction of the battle lagged even more 
than ordinarily.”54 Nevertheless, the communications system employed in 1918 was 
certainly a lot more flexible, robust and sophisticated than it had been in 1914, a 
reflection in part of the willingness and ability of the British Army to adapt to the 
conditions of modern, industrialised warfare. 
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Gallipoli 
 Having outlined the chief characteristics of the communication technologies 
employed by the British Army on the Western Front, it is now possible to offer a 
comparative assessment of the communications systems developed by British forces 
elsewhere during the war. Arguably the most infamous British “sideshow” of the First 
World War was the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign of 1915, aimed at knocking 
Germany’s ally, Turkey, out of the war.55 Recent studies of the campaign lay blame 
for its failure on a combination of factors, including: a lack of sufficient manpower, 
material and political support; structural weaknesses in the British command system; 
Allied inexperience of fighting modern war; and, fierce Turkish resistance.
56
 While 
poor communications have been cited by some historians as a contributory factor to 
the Allied defeat,
57
 no in-depth examination of the British communications system 
during the Gallipoli campaign has been made.  
Although there already existed a Manual of Combined Naval and Military 
Operations, the British Army and the Royal Navy had had little practical experience 
working together before the war.
58
 As the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), General Sir Ian Hamilton, noted in his Gallipoli Diary, 
given “the amount of original thinking and improvisation demanded by a landing 
operation,” the commander of the naval forces, Admiral John de Robeck, “is working 
under conditions just as unusual to him as mine are to me.”59 It was perhaps fortunate, 
therefore, that the man appointed as Director of Army Signals on Hamilton’s staff, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Bowman-Manifold, had not only attended the Royal 
Naval War College in 1908, but had also served as the commander of I Corps Signal 
Company on the Western Front in 1914.
60
 With a firm understanding of both army 
and naval communication practices, Bowman-Manifold was instrumental in helping 
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formulate Signal Organization for Combined Operations, a pamphlet issued to all 
naval and army units taking part in the landings in order to establish a common set of 
methods between the two services.
61
 It was agreed in general that the navy would be 
responsible for maintaining communications from ship-to-ship and between the ships 
and the landing beaches, while the army would take charge of all communications 
ashore.
62
 Small naval signal parties were to establish visual communication between 
ships and the shore on each of the five landing beaches at Helles, code-named “S”, 
“V”, “W”, “X” and “Y” respectively, and at Anzac Cove. A combined beach signal 
office would be opened on “W” Beach and at Anzac, where the navy would provide 
wireless and visual links to the ships offshore, and to which the army was to connect 
the various headquarters on land. The army would also establish wireless stations on 
the flanks of “V” Beach and at Anzac in order to direct naval gunfire, while army 
visual signallers were employed on board transport vessels to signal to the covering 
ships.
63
 
 Unfortunately, the appointment of Bowman-Manifold and the issuing of 
Signal Organization for Combined Operations could not make up for the general lack 
of practical experience in conducting amphibious operations and the absence of a joint 
organization to reconcile inter-service communication problems in the years 
preceding the war. Serious problems occurred during the initial landings on 25 April 
when the two services were required to link up and interact. For example, although it 
had been agreed that naval wireless procedure be adopted, severe delays occurred in 
the transmission of messages from shore-to-ship on account of army operators being 
unfamiliar with naval ciphering methods and operating frequencies.
64
 As Hamilton 
recorded in his diary the following day: “Our naval and military signallers were at 
sixes and sevens… [W]e could not get in touch with the soldiers at all.”65 Adding to 
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these difficulties was the severe shortage of despatch boats to deliver messages from 
ship-to-ship, the breakdown of the Royal Naval Air Service’s wireless transmitters 
used for spotting naval gunfire, and the inability of the army visual signallers aboard 
transports to get to grips with the naval system of hoists which was used for sending 
messages over distances beyond the operating ranges of Morse and semaphore.
66
 
Compounding all these problems, however, were the difficulties involved in 
connecting the various army headquarters ashore to the beach signal offices. 
Telephone lines were frequently cut by Turkish shellfire, while the large distances and 
the mass of ravines and gullies which characterized the Gallipoli coastline made it 
difficult for commanders to assess the situation on neighbouring beaches.
67
 As 
Brigadier-General Cunliffe Owen, the ANZAC artillery commander, later reported, 
“units were much mixed up. No one really knew where anyone was.”68  
 Whilst inexperience in maintaining communications in modern, amphibious 
operations and the limitations of early twentieth century communications technology 
both contributed to the breakdown of communications once the Allied troops at 
Gallipoli were ashore, the chronic shortage of signal equipment and trained personnel 
exacerbated the situation. During the opening three days of the campaign, GHQ, 
located on board H.M.T. Arcadian,
69
 was without a signal company, and so had to 
improvise as best it could by borrowing four Marconi pack wireless detachments from 
the ANZAC Signal Company. When GHQ Signal Company did arrive on board 
H.M.T. Scotian, most of its stores were located on another ship, which meant that it 
was inoperative for some time. The headquarters of VIII Corps, commanded by 
Lieutenant-General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was not established ashore until early 
June, but it too was without its signal company until July. Finally, it had been 
arranged that the stores, horses and transport of the corps and divisional signal 
 16 
companies were to be left on the advanced base on the island of Lemnos until the 
initial landings had been successful and the troops had made significant progress 
inland. The disappointing outcome of the initial landings, however, meant that signal 
stores remained on Lemnos for the majority of the campaign.
70
 
The shortage of signal stores and trained personnel resulted in some unusual 
practices and skilful acts of improvisation, highlighting the long-standing tradition of 
pragmatism inherent in the British Army.
71
 In a letter to his wife, one signal officer 
complained of having to lay “weird lines, with poles hidden from shell-fire, uneven 
spans, some 400 yds. long! Everything dominated by the one idea that a line if safe 
from shell-fire need not be constructionally ideal.”72 Similarly, while in some units 
telephone receiver diaphragms had to be adapted from tobacco tin lids,
73
 at the Battle 
of Gully Ravine on 28 June, each attacking infantryman of the 29
th
 Division wore “a 
triangular piece of biscuit tin” on his back in order to reflect sunlight thus enabling the 
commanders in the rear to monitor their progress.
74
 Watching from his command post, 
Hamilton described the attack “as if someone had quite suddenly flung a big handful 
of diamonds on to the landscape.”75 
 With the onset of trench warfare the communications system at Gallipoli very 
quickly assumed the rigid characteristics of that employed on the Western Front.
76
 
Telephone and telegraph lines were duplicated and laid to link up the various 
headquarters ashore, while extensive use of submarine cables were made to connect 
the beach signal stations to each other, GHQ and the advanced base. On 29 April, the 
Eastern Telegraph Company’s cable ship Levant II laid a line connecting “W” Beach 
to the cable station on the island of Tenedos, from which telegraphic communication 
to Egypt and the UK already existed. Between 1-2 May, lines were laid between the 
beach signal stations on Helles and Anzac, and further extended to GHQ onboard the 
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Arcadian anchored off “W” Beach. Due to the threat posed by German submarines 
however, the Arcadian was moved to Kephalos Bay on the island of Imbros where, on 
31 May, GHQ was established ashore, remaining there for the rest of the campaign. 
Existing Turkish and Greek submarine cables were used to connect GHQ to Helles 
and to Lemnos which then put it in telegraphic communication with Alexandria and 
London. The system was finally completed in July when a direct cable was laid from 
GHQ to Anzac.
77
  
 In August, Hamilton launched another amphibious operation aimed at 
breaking the stalemate on the peninsula. The failure of the landings of the 10
th
 and 
11
th
 Divisions of IX Corps at Suvla Bay on 6-7 August highlighted not only the 
weaknesses of the army’s means of communication but also, more importantly, the 
structural inadequacies of the British command system.
78
 Although much of the work 
was carried out in complete darkness, communications during the landings were 
established according to plan. Within four hours of the initial beach landings a 
submarine cable had been laid successfully between Imbros and the corps signal 
office at Nibrunesi Point in Suvla. Telephone lines were laid to connect this office to 
division and brigade headquarters, as well as to Anzac Cove, whilst wireless and 
visual communication was established with the covering ships.
79
 In spite of these 
provisions, the commanders of GHQ, IX Corps, and the attacking divisions all 
complained, at one time or another, of being starved of adequate and timely 
information.
80
 While the success of the operation undoubtedly required “an 
improvement in communications both for the receipt of information as to the situation 
and the issue of orders,” the weakness of the communications system exacerbated a 
much more serious problem, namely the inadequate command arrangements.
81
 
Hamilton was “marooned upon an island” 20 miles away,82 while the commander of 
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IX Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stopford, chose to direct the operation 
aboard the destroyer Jonquil, anchored off Suvla Bay, whose only means of 
communicating with the forces ashore was via the medium of semaphore. Given also 
that there were too few despatch boats available to enable Stopford’s staff to make 
regular visits to the beaches, and that it took until the morning of 8 August for a direct 
telephone line to be laid, Stopford’s decision to remain on board the Jonquil until the 
evening of 8 August almost certainly contributed to the failure of the operation.
83
 In 
sum, the failure to capitalize on the initial success of the landings owed more to the 
structural and institutional weaknesses of the British command system than to the 
shortcomings of communications technology.
84
  
 Ironically, perhaps the most impressive and successful aspect of 
communications at Gallipoli occurred during the evacuation of the peninsula between 
December 1915 and January 1916. The maintenance of reliable communications with 
a minimum number of personnel, whist saving as much equipment as possible, was 
essential if the operation was to have any chance of succeeding. The principle of 
lower formation headquarters falling back to the headquarters of higher formations 
was adopted, much like that employed by retreating British units on the Western Front 
in the spring of 1918,
85
 and although additional lines were laid on top of the existing 
telephone system in case of emergency, they were not needed in the end. Fortunately 
the Turks had neither valve amplifiers to tap into the British telephone system nor a 
sufficient number of aeroplanes to observe from the air the activity of their retreating 
enemy.
86
 Nonetheless, this should not detract from what was an otherwise smooth and 
very efficient operation in which communications played an important role. As one 
report later testified: “The whole system of communications was maintained 
throughout without a hitch.”87 
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Mesopotamia 
 Whereas the rigidity of the British communications system at Gallipoli bore 
striking similarity to that employed on the Western Front, the army’s communication 
practice in Mesopotamia was, for the most part, markedly different. This can be 
attributed mainly to the geographic and climatic conditions of the country, but also to 
a less dense force-to-space ratio, which resulted in campaigns of greater mobility and 
manoeuvre. From a historiographical perspective, studies of the fighting in 
Mesopotamia tend to say little of real substance with regards to communications, 
preferring instead to focus on the logistical aspects of the campaign.
88
 Those that do 
mention communications have done so mainly with reference to their use for signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) purposes.
89
  
 The most striking feature of the Mesopotamian campaign was the widespread 
use of wireless. From the outset British forces became dependent on wireless since it 
was very often the only means of communication that could adequately bridge the 
large distances between mobile units. The Marconi 1.5 kilowatt Wagon Set, powered 
by a 6 horsepower Douglas engine, for example, could send and receive messages 
over distances of between 150 and, on occasions, 350 miles.
90
 Wireless was also a 
much more flexible method of communication than either telegraph or telephone. The 
latter methods not only impeded the freedom and mobility of a unit on the move but, 
as one signal officer observed, “the lines are some hundreds of miles long, and run 
through areas devoid of troops. So you can imagine the maintenance of the lines is not 
too easy.”91 Faults and interruptions on the lines were commonplace, some as a result 
of wilful damage by the native Arab population.
92
 Finally, the popularity of wireless 
amongst commanders and their staff can be attributed to the absence of strict security 
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procedures during the first two years of the campaign, when all but the “most secret” 
messages could be transmitted without having to go through a lengthy and 
complicated encryption process. Yet even after tighter security measures were 
enforced in 1916, GHQ continued to impress on all commanders “the importance of 
keeping in closest touch by wireless throughout operations.”93  
 Nevertheless, as one former wireless operator in the 6
th
 Indian Division 
remarked after the war, wireless could at times be “a very hit and miss game.”94 
Atmospheric disturbances, for instance, were a frequent problem in Mesopotamia, 
rendering the reading of some wireless messages very difficult for the receiving 
operator.
95
 At Kut-al-Amara in April 1916, for instance, strong atmospherics 
hampered wireless communication between the commander of the besieged British 
garrison, Major-General Sir Charles Townshend, and the relief forces attempting to 
reach them.
96
 The arrangements for transporting wireless sets on mule carts also 
caused problems. As the commander of the 34
th
 Division Signal Company observed, 
“jolting over the desert in carts was hardly good for such instruments and the dust 
played havoc with it.”97 Establishing wireless communication was also a rather time-
consuming affair. A standard Marconi Pack Set took an average of 15-20 minutes to 
erect and a further 15 minutes to dismantle.
98
 When Lieutenant-General Sir Stanley 
Maude demanded regular updates from the cavalry during the advance on Baghdad in 
1917, their wireless sets had to be set up every hour, severely impeding mobility.
99
 
This was still a common complaint of the cavalry during the advance on Mosul in 
October 1918.
100
  
Therefore, every effort was made to ensure that units had access to a reliable 
and efficient telecommunications network. Initially, this proved rather difficult since 
“there were no obvious points of access to the landlines used by the Turkish 6th 
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Army.”101 Gradually, however, as British forces advanced further inland extensive use 
was made of the civilian telegraph lines that linked the main towns and cities – Basra, 
Amara, Baghdad, Naziriya and Ahwaz – to one another. For the most part, these lines 
were owned and worked by the Indian Government Telegraph Department whose 
staff comprised about one-third army operators and two-thirds civilians.
102
 In late 
1916 however, the staff were absorbed into a newly formed Lines of Communication 
Signal Company, and a separate military route, consisting in part of abandoned 
Turkish lines and apparatus, was built from Basra to Baghdad.
103
 At the tactical level, 
telephone cables were laid between division and brigade headquarters when the 
distances between them were not too great. These were also extended down to 
battalion headquarters during static periods, though visual signalling via heliograph 
was the preferred method of communication between the lower formations whilst on 
the move.
104
 
 Besides the aforementioned difficulties experienced in maintaining the civilian 
telegraph and telephone system, lines laid at the tactical level suffered from the same 
vulnerabilities as those on the Western Front. For example, during the attack on 
Nasiriya in July 1915, telephonic communication was rendered extremely difficult as 
a result of the lines being constantly cut by enemy shellfire.
105
 On the whole, 
however, such occurrences were more infrequent than, and certainly not as acute as, 
those experienced by the armies on the Western Front. This owed as much to the less 
intense nature of the Mesopotamian campaign as it did to the general dearth of 
concentrated Turkish artillery fire. As one signal officer noted in a letter to his wife in 
September 1916, even when the Turks did “heave over a few spare shells, we view 
their efforts rather with pained surprise than with any passionate resentment.”106 
During a successful attack carried out by the 21
st
 Brigade (7
th
 Indian Division) on 
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Turkish positions around Mushahida, 20 miles north of Baghdad, on 14 March 1917, 
for instance, although “the Brigade Signalling Officer and many of his men were 
killed,” the telephone lines of the Black Watch Regiment held-up well and 
“intermittent communication was kept up throughout the battle between the battalion, 
the covering batteries, and the Brigade Commander.”107 
Yet the mobile nature of the war in Mesopotamia presented its own unique set 
of communication dilemmas. Attempts to relieve the besieged British forces at Kut-al-
Amara between January and April 1916, for example, failed partly on account of the 
lack of coordination between the relief forces, which was itself the result of the 
breakdown of telephonic communication between brigades and division headquarters. 
As the war diary of 13
th
 Division testifies: “… telephone comms. to Bdes. broke down 
owing to cable parties not being able to keep up with Bde. HQrs. which moved very 
quickly.”108 Forward of brigade headquarters, the dearth of timely and accurate 
information was often attributed to the reliance placed upon runners and mounted 
orderlies who, more often than not, were either killed before they arrived at their 
destination or carried messages containing information that was out of date and of 
little use by the time it reached its intended recipient.
109
 In these circumstances some 
senior officers felt they had no other option but to exercise command much closer the 
front line than they had hitherto been accustomed to. Although this overcame the 
problems brought about by the limitations of the means of communication available, 
as Townshend discovered at the battle of Ctesiphon in November 1915, it also had the 
negative effect of distorting the commander’s decision-making ability, forcing him to 
lose sight of the bigger picture.
110
 
Finally, an arguably even greater problem was the inadequate supply of men 
and equipment, particularly during the first half of the campaign. Communication 
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became almost entirely lost when both the 16
th
 and 17
th
 Infantry Brigades ran out of 
telephone line during the Battle of Kut in late September 1915, while the relief forces 
at Kut in December suffered from chronic shortages of adequate telephone cable and 
apparatus.
111
 It was not until late 1916 that a Signal Depot in Mesopotamia was 
established. Thereafter the supply of stores improved, though the Signal Service 
continued to struggle with rather modest resources until the end of the war.
112
 Indeed, 
as the history of the Royal Corps of Signals notes, the low priority status afforded the 
theatre by the British government meant that the provision of personnel and 
equipment in divisional and brigade signal units in Mesopotamia by the autumn of 
1918 “had not expanded comparatively with those on the Western Front.”113 
 
Egypt and Palestine 
As in Mesopotamia, the nature of British military operations in Egypt and 
Palestine was dictated by a similar combination of factors, including wide frontages, 
open desert flanks, long lines of communication, adverse climate and terrain, and a 
relatively light concentration of enemy artillery. In these circumstances the fighting 
was more or less fluid, particularly from 1917 when General Sir Edmund Allenby 
assumed command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and the campaign 
pursued the much more aggressive objective of driving the Turks out of Palestine.
114
 
Although British strategy, intelligence and use of chemical weapons in Egypt and 
Palestine have been the subjects of recent scholarly enquiry, communications has 
received rather short shrift.
115
 In many respects, the communication practices of 
British forces in Egypt and Palestine shared many of the characteristics of those 
employed in Mesopotamia, though there were some notable differences.  
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For instance, as in Mesopotamia, wireless proved to be of much greater 
relative value in Egypt and Palestine than it did on the Western Front. A much more 
favourable force-to-space ratio and the general absence of both prolonged trench 
stalemate and concentrated artillery barrages presented circumstances which were 
much more conducive for the successful employment of wireless. At the operational 
level, a chain of wireless stations was established during 1916, linking up the 
principal headquarters in the Sinai and along the Suez Canal with GHQ in Cairo and 
the Signal Depot at Alexandria.
116
 Tactically, by 1918 all attacking division and 
brigade headquarters were ordered to establish wireless communication with each 
other as soon as possible, “even if telephone lines are working satisfactorily.”117 
Wireless was also used by the RAF to help direct artillery fire during the last months 
of the war.
118
 The most effective use of wireless was made by the cavalry and the 
Desert Mounted Corps during the advance towards Damascus and Aleppo in 
September and October 1918, when line communication was difficult to establish.
119
 
However, the infantry in Egypt and Palestine did not employ wireless for 
communication purposes to the same extent as their counterparts in Mesopotamia. 
There are three main explanations for this: first, strict security procedures were 
vigorously enforced from the outset of the campaign. No messages were to be 
transmitted or accepted in “clear” due to the fear of enemy interception.120 To some 
extent this fear was of British making. From 1917, Turkish telegraph and telephone 
lines were systematically destroyed in order to force the army to use wireless more 
extensively, which the British could then intercept.
121
 Although this gave the British 
Army access to “a remarkable amount of information,” it also heightened concerns 
that British wireless messages could be read by the Turks;
122
 second, the adverse 
climate and geography of Egypt and Palestine resulted in a much higher incidence of 
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wireless atmospherics and static disturbances than in Mesopotamia.
123
 Again, this 
persuaded many commanders to rely on alternative methods of communication; and 
third, by reason of the relatively light concentration of Turkish artillery fire, most 
forward telephone lines laid by the infantry suffered only minor damage during the 
heat of battle.
124
 During the Battle of Sharon in September 1918 for example, 
although BF Trench Sets had been issued to the 162
nd
 and 163
rd
 Brigades of 54
th
 
Division, “owing to cables holding up no necessity arose for the use of wireless.”125 
Thus, in Egypt and Palestine a much greater emphasis was placed upon 
telephone and telegraph as the principal means of communication from GHQ down to 
brigade headquarters. As a report by 60
th
 Division Signal Company following the 
Third Battle of Gaza in November 1917 made clear, “communications, instead of 
being an aid to operations, have become an absolute necessity; the Staffs being most 
exacting with regards to communications, not only expecting facilities similar to those 
of trench warfare, but depending on them.”126 At the operational level, GHQ in Cairo 
relied primarily on civil lines to connect it to the principal headquarters along the 
Suez Canal. Following the defeat of Turkish forces at Rumani in August 1916, 
however, a permanent telephone trunk line was constructed through the Sinai along 
the same route as the railway and water pipeline, eventually reaching Rafah near the 
Palestinian border in early 1917. After the fall of Gaza in November 1917 the trunk 
line was extended with each successive advance until, in the autumn of 1918, a 
system was in place that connected the principal centres of Gaza, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Tul 
Keram and Haifa.
127
 Though laying cable across the desert was a fatiguing affair, 
most Airline Sections could erect line at a rate of over four miles per day.
128
 To speed 
up the process, however, every effort was made to utilize abandoned Turkish poles 
 26 
and lines, with specific instructions issued to all troops not to purposely damage or cut 
them down.
129
 
At the tactical level, telephone formed the principal means of communication 
between division, brigade and battalion headquarters. Although the lines were usually 
laid along the ground, they were sometimes laid on short poles or stakes and, on 
occasions, even buried.
130
 However, unlike on the Western Front, the main reason for 
the latter methods was not so much to protect the cables from the effects of enemy 
shellfire but rather from the damage done by the movement of friendly troops, 
cavalry, guns and transport.
131
 The mobile nature of operations in Palestine also posed 
another dilemma for cable communication, one that British commanders on the 
Western Front did not have to contend with until the last months of the war.
132
 As the 
commander of 10
th
 Division Signal Company, Major M.E. Webb, noted in August 
1918: “With fast moving troops, telephone communication is obviously impossible 
while the HQrs. are actually moving, unless they stop and thereby hold up the 
progress of the operations, or delay themselves.”133 The rapidity with which 
formations moved also made it difficult for cable detachments to reel up cable fast 
enough for it to be re-laid and re-used.
134
 Despite an increase in the establishment of 
cable from 1917, the Signal Service in Palestine continued to struggle with similar 
personnel and material shortages experienced in the other “peripheral” theatres. As a 
memorandum issued by the Director of Army Signals in early February 1917 made 
clear: “The necessity for rigid economy in all technical material must be brought to 
the notice of all ranks, and constantly borne in mind.”135 This, combined with the 
heavy demand for telephonic communication, often resulted in serious congestion on 
forward telephone lines at critical moments during the heat of battle.
136
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To alleviate some of these problems, from early 1918 commanders were urged 
to make greater use of an array of alternative methods of communication.
137
 Visual 
signalling was regarded as a valuable means of communication forward of brigade 
headquarters since it was ideally suited to the geographical and meteorological 
attributes of the region. Using flags and heliograph during the day and electric lamps 
at night, visual signalling was chiefly employed during the initial stages of an 
advance, when headquarters were on the move and telephone lines were in the process 
of being laid.
138
 In addition to visual signalling, 300 carrier pigeons were made 
available to British forces from the autumn of 1917. The birds were flown mainly 
from brigade and battalion headquarters to portable lofts at division headquarters, and 
proved to be of some value. During the Third Battle of Gaza, for instance, over 180 
pigeon messages were received at various headquarters during the course of 
operations, including that pertaining to the capture of Tel-el-Saba to the south of 
Beersheba.
139
 Finally, extensive use was made of runners and liaison officers at the 
tactical level and motorcycle despatch riders along the lines of communication. 
Although an efficient runner relay system and despatch rider letter service gradually 
emerged, the principal drawback to such methods in the heat of battle, as one report 
noted, was that: “The time taken for runners and mounted despatch riders to locate the 
various HQ when they were continually moving causes messages to be so delayed 
that by the time they arrive at their destination the whole situation may have 
changed.”140 
In light of the difficulties involved in maintaining effective communications at 
the tactical level, both brigade and battalion commanders increasingly felt obligated to 
leave their respective headquarters and attempt to conduct operations closer to the 
firing line. In one infamous example cited in the official history, Brigadier-General 
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J.B. Pollock-McCall, GOC 155
th
 Infantry Brigade, personally organised and then led 
the attack of the 1/4
th
 and 1/5
th
 King’s Own Scottish Borderers on El Mughar Ridge 
on 13 November 1917. Although the attack was a resounding success, Pollock-
McCall was fortunate to emerge unscathed after his helmet was pierced by a Turkish 
bullet. Such behaviour would have been considered unbecoming of a brigade 
commander in the trench conditions of the Western Front.
141
 
 
East Africa 
The predominant factors influencing both the nature of the fighting and British 
communication practice in East Africa were strikingly similar to those in the Middle 
East. Communications were clearly vital to British interests since one of the main 
objectives of British strategy from the outset of the war in Africa was the destruction 
of Germany’s colonial wireless stations. While this aspect of communications has 
been well-documented by historians, coverage of the operational and tactical facets of 
British communications practice in East Africa has been more patchy.
142
 This is 
somewhat surprising given both the peculiar conditions under which communications 
had to be provided and maintained, and the affect that communications had on 
shaping the nature of the fighting. 
Perhaps the most unique feature of British communications in East Africa was 
the heterogeneous composition of the signal units. Three divisional signal companies 
had been formed by 1916, two consisting of a mixture of British, Indian and African 
personnel, while the third was of South African origin.
143
 In addition to these were the 
GHQ and Lines of Communication signal companies, also composed “of men of 
different nationalities – of different training – speaking different languages, with 
equipment of varying patterns thrown together without any coordinated training to 
 29 
carry out an important operation in unknown country.”144 A report by a British signal 
officer regarding the state of a group of Nigerian signallers in early 1917, for instance, 
complained that the postal service men had “practically no knowledge of ordinary 
signals work,” that the signallers were slow at visual and “know nothing of telephone 
work,” and that the clerks were “lazy, objectionable and inefficient.” With regards to 
the linesmen, the officer remarked sarcastically: “I find an ordinary porter with two 
days practice is more use.”145 This lack of common training and adequate experience 
made the task of establishing a reliable and efficient communications system much 
more difficult than in the other theatres. For example, in accounting for the fact that 
no wireless messages had been transmitted from the South African Mounted Brigade 
to GHQ during operations on 20-21 March 1916, the Deputy Director of Army 
Signals, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Hawtrey, blamed the lack of timely information on 
the brigade’s signal officer, Captain F.E. Jackson, since “he is a visual signaller and 
therefore does not make sufficient use of a technical side of the service at his 
disposal.”146 
The dearth of highly skilled and experienced signallers was compounded by 
the enormous casualty rates caused by diseases such as dysentery and malaria. 
Throughout the East African campaign the ratio of non-battle casualties to battle 
casualties was roughly 30 to 1.
147
 By the end of 1916, 82 per cent of the signallers in 
South African units were declared “unfit” for duty, while the motorcycle despatch 
rider service was 40 per cent below establishment as a result of sickness and 
disease.
148
 As well as being hugely understaffed the Signal Service also suffered from 
acute shortages of stores and equipment, particularly during the first half of the war. 
Not only was the provision of telephones, long distance signalling lamps and the 
necessary spare parts for motorcycles extremely poor but, as Hawtrey noted in July 
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1916, even the telephone and telegraph cable provided to the Signal Service in East 
Africa had been “condemned about six years ago in India as unfit for use.”149 It 
should be noted, however, that these problems were not unique since the German 
forces under Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck were forced to plunder Belgian and 
Portuguese cable and improvise lines and insulators from barbed wire, beer bottles 
and bamboo.
150
  
In spite of such deprivations the signal units in East Africa managed to 
provide a service which was of paramount importance to the successful conduct of 
operations. The only pre-existing system of communication available at the outset of 
the war were the telegraph lines built alongside the principal railways from Mombasa 
to Lake Victoria via Nairobi, and from Tanga to Mount Kilimanjaro in British East 
Africa. The only railway in German East Africa ran from east to west from Dar-es-
Salaam to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika.
151
 Since none of these lines ran in the general 
direction of the British advance, a significant amount of time and effort was invested 
in extending and maintaining the telegraph system for military purposes. By July 
1916, 1,700 miles of new permanent and semi-permanent airline routes had been 
built. However, these long lines were extremely vulnerable to the natural hazards of 
the country. Besides the problems caused by tropical storms and bush fires, in certain 
areas airline had to be raised at least 25 feet off the ground in order to avoid being 
damaged by roaming giraffes. As such, the lines were frequently out of service and 
constantly having to be repaired. Therefore a chain of visual stations, operating over 
distances of between 30 and 70 miles, was established to provide an emergency 
means of communication when the lines were faulty.
152
 
By far the greatest challenge facing signal units in East Africa, however, was 
the provision and maintenance of communication between the widely dispersed 
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mobile columns and between the advancing columns and their respective bases. As 
one officer noted after the war: “The meaning of the ‘fog of war’ only becomes 
properly appreciated when you find yourself turned loose in the bush with a 
detachment of perhaps a hundred men… Everything goes according to plan until you 
have proceeded for perhaps a quarter of a mile, and then you begin to wonder what 
has happened and what has become of everybody.”153 Indeed, the difficulty of 
maintaining adequate communications exacerbated the inability of British and Allied 
forces to close-in on, and decisively engage, Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces in a large-scale 
pitched battle for much of the war. According to Brigadier-General Charles Fendall, 
Assistant Adjutant-General of the East African Force (1916-18): “It was important 
that every column used in converging movements should be strong enough to hold its 
own until given time for other forces in that area to get up and join in the fight.”154 
However, as Lettow-Vorbeck observed in his memoirs, “it was quite impossible for 
the enemy, in spite of the unremitting labours of his wireless service, to obtain a clear 
picture of the situation as a whole and to keep his subordinate leaders informed in 
time of all the changes of the situation.”155 With poor communications making it 
difficult for the pursuing British and Allied forces to co-ordinate their movements and 
bring effective concentrated force to bear on the enemy, fighting often resolved into 
“a series of local operations” which were “independent of each other,” such as at 
Mkalamo on 9 June 1916 or at Namirrue on 23 July 1918, where on both occasions 
Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were allowed to extricate themselves relatively unscathed.156 
In spite of the difficulties associated with laying lines in mobile operations, 
and notwithstanding the damage done to lines by bush fires, tropical storms, troop 
movement and “ant ravages,” the telephone quickly became the primary means of 
tactical communication.
157
 As one officer testified after the war: 
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Telephone communication is practically indispensible in 
modern bush fighting. It not only permits of linking up 
headquarters with units and detachments, but also lays a trail 
for them which proves invaluable when sending messengers, 
food, stretchers or ammunition… Fighting in the bush is 
practically synonymous with fighting in the dark, and the 
telephone is not only a necessity but a great moral asset, as it 
takes the place of eyes.
158
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the telephone’s limitations in mobile bush operations ensured that an 
array of alternative means of communication were always on stand-by. Visual 
signalling, using heliographs and flags during the day and signalling lamps at night, 
was widely utilized, as were runners and mounted or motorcycle despatch riders. With 
regards to the latter, however, the thick bush country and lack of suitable roads 
resulted in a very high incidence of mechanical breakdowns, for which there was a 
very limited supply of spare parts and oil.
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 Given the principal drawbacks of the above methods, the large geographical 
spread of the forces and the fluidity of operations, British commanders in East Africa, 
like their counterparts in the Middle East, very quickly came to appreciate the value 
afforded by wireless. As Hawtrey informed Captain Jackson in March 1916, wireless 
should “always accompany a mounted detached force taking guns.”160 However, the 
equatorial climate resulted in poor wireless atmospherics, while the thick bush 
country often reduced the range of a standard Marconi wagon set from 150 to 25 
miles and a pack set from 80 miles to just 12.
161
 The sets were also regularly on the 
move, being erected and dismantled on a daily basis, and often carried in loads by the 
native porters.
162
 Wear and tear was therefore a major problem, with sets requiring 
regular “extensive overhaul and repair.”163 For all the difficulties involved in its use, 
however, wireless was widely employed during the last two years of the war in East 
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Africa, providing an invaluable means of communication in the most trying of 
circumstances. 
 
Macedonia 
In stark contrast to the British Army’s operations in the Middle East and East 
Africa, the nature of the fighting in Macedonia was almost identical to the trench 
stalemate endured on the Western Front and Gallipoli peninsula. Between October 
1915 and September 1918 the Allied forces in Macedonia were locked in what the 
Germans referred to as “the biggest internment camp in Europe.”164 The 
communication practices of the Signal Service, therefore, followed a very similar 
pattern to those in France and Belgium. However, as in the other subsidiary theatres, 
British signal units in Macedonia suffered from chronic shortages of both men and 
resources in a country with inhospitable climate and terrain. Despite these handicaps 
the Signal Service developed a healthy interest in innovation and experimentation 
which gradually resulted in the establishment of a semi-reliable and efficient 
communications system. 
From the initial Allied landing at Salonika in October 1915 one of the biggest 
obstacles hindering British communication practice was the rather hostile attitude 
adopted by the neutral Greek government.
165
 The local authorities in and around 
Salonika refused to give the Allies permission to use the existing civil 
telecommunication network. This made the work of the signal units much more 
arduous since they were forced to dip into their already limited supply of cable and 
lay it through the streets at night so as not to antagonize the local population. After 
much arguing, the Greek authorities reluctantly gave the British the go-ahead to 
suspend cable on the telegraph lines that ran alongside the Salonika-Sarigol-Doiran 
 34 
railway – a distance of some 45 miles. This was completed at the end of November 
1915 and used to good effect during the withdrawal from Serbia in December. Up 
until the same time, strategic communication with both London and Alexandria had to 
be made through the Eastern Telegraph Company, via the operators in the civil post 
office. This rather laborious process came to an end on 20 December when, on the 
orders of the Director of Army Signals, Egypt, Brigadier-General Bowman-Manifold, 
a submarine cable was laid between Salonika and the island of Mudros, thereby 
making the Allied forces in Salonika independent of the civilian system.
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When the Allies formally took control of the civil telegraph offices and 
telephone exchanges in June 1916 the shortage of signal stores and personnel had 
reached an acute stage. The building of a Signal Park two months previously had 
resulted in only minor increases to stocks.
167
 Galvanised iron wire, telegraph poles 
and bobbin insulators had to be purchased locally while magneto telephone exchanges 
had to be improvised from electric light plugs and sockets, and “buzzer” switchboards 
improvised from bullets and cartridge cases.
168
 With regards to personnel, the 
Director of Army Signals, Major Alexander Grubb, noted in January 1917 that, 
although there was ample unskilled labour available, “the number of permanent 
linemen is not at present large enough to make really quick process… It is hoped that 
as the work goes on, more men will rapidly become trained and a much faster rate of 
progress will be maintained.”169 The situation did gradually improve. Between 
January 1916 and December 1917, British forces in Salonika were supplied with 
12,300 miles of cable, 1,090 magneto telephones and 1,450 “buzzer” telephones. 
However, it was not enough to meet the insatiable needs of the army. On 5 January 
1918, Grubb issued a circular memorandum calling for the “urgent necessity for 
economy in the expenditure of Signal Service stores.” Although he hoped that the 
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situation would improve, three months later, with the Allies reeling from the German 
spring offensives on the Western Front, Grubb had to accept that “under present 
circumstances we can only expect the barest necessities in the way of stores.”170 
Compounding the troubles of the Signal Service in Macedonia were the 
natural hazards presented by the country. The regional infrastructure was very under-
developed. Roads, in particular, were virtually non-existent, with supplies having to 
be hauled across a combination of swamps, streams and mountainous terrain.
171
 This 
presented enormous difficulties for despatch riders and mounted orderlies whose task 
was made even more difficult during periods of bad weather. In November 1916, for 
instance, heavy rains made the condition of the road between GHQ and XII Corps 
headquarters so bad that arrangements had to be made to take messages via 
aeroplane.
172
 As in East Africa, too, sickness and disease took a heavy toll on the 
army. Between July and August 1916, 295 troops and NCOs of the Army Signal 
Company, approximately 55 per cent of its total strength, were admitted to hospital 
suffering from the effects of malaria and sand fly fever.
173
 This seriously depleted the 
number of men available for work, stretching the resources of the signal units to 
almost breaking point. 
The static nature of the fighting in Macedonia meant that the British 
communications system shared many of the characteristics of that employed on the 
Western Front. The most obvious feature was the development of an extensive 
telephone and telegraph network. During the winter of 1915/16 the first consignments 
of much needed cable and suitable poles to construct permanent airline routes to the 
headquarters of XII and XVI Corps arrived. As Major Geoffrey Rawson, AD Signals 
XII Corps, related after the war, these were badly needed since the civil lines that 
were hitherto being used by the army “were not of great service as they were of poor 
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construction, the poles in many cases being rotten and the few wires heavy and 
slack.”174 However, from April 1916 the interposition of French and Italian divisions 
between the two British corps complicated signal arrangements, increasing the 
distance from Salonika to the headquarters of XII Corps and XVI Corps to 23 and 50 
miles respectively.
175
 The complex and over-elaborate line system that subsequently 
emerged caused great difficulties for maintenance. It was perhaps fortunate therefore 
that on 18 August 1917 a fire broke out in Salonika, burning most of the telephone 
cables in the town. This provided the opportunity to replace the lines to the corps 
headquarters with a much simpler system. By the beginning of October 1917, the 
Army and Lines of Communication signal companies presided over 375 miles of 
permanent line route, carrying 2,800 miles of wire.
176
 
The communications system forward of corps headquarters bore an even 
closer resemblance to that on the Western Front, where the burying of telephone lines 
had been standard practice since 1915. This was particularly the case on XII Corps 
front where the fiercest fighting took place. Initially, the rocky terrain and lack of 
topsoil made the burying of telephone lines extremely difficult. Most lines were either 
poled or laid along the ground, yet this made them vulnerable to shellfire, troop 
movement and, in the summer, damage from grass fires.
177
 The vulnerability of the 
unburied cables of the 26
th
 and 27
th
 Divisions during the Battle of Doiran in the spring 
of 1917, for instance, was duly noted and in February 1918 work began on the 
construction of a 1,000 yard cable trench to protect the system of artillery 
communications in 22
nd
 Division.
178
 Although it took six months to complete on 
account of having to cut through almost solid rock, it played an important role in the 
final Allied assaults against the retreating Bulgarian forces in September 1918.
179
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Given the difficulties involved in establishing line-based communications, and 
in light of the fact that British forces from November 1916 held a 90 mile sector of 
the frontline, it would be reasonable to assume that wireless played a prominent role 
in the army’s communications system. However, apart from its use for the early 
warning anti-aircraft system developed in 1916-17, the full potential of wireless was 
not exploited by British forces in Macedonia. This was largely on account of the 
limited number of wireless sets and trained operators available. Consequently, 
wireless was regarded as a secondary means of communication, just as it was on the 
Western Front until 1918, when the transition from static to more mobile warfare 
exposed the limitations of line-based communications in such operations.
180
 This 
point was illustrated in February 1918 when the airline routes between GHQ and 
corps headquarters were badly damaged by a severe snow storm. Wireless became the 
principal means of communication during the three month period the lines were being 
repaired. Once the line system was fully restored, however, wireless dropped out of 
use completely.
181
 
 
Conclusion 
 In 1919, an official account of the actions of the EEF under General Allenby 
observed: “… while the Signal Service is functioning as a whole, the parts are 
constantly being altered and improved, and the smooth working of the machine must 
go on owing to elasticity of the organization and the adaptability of individual 
members.”182 Although it relates specifically to the British military operations 
conducted in Egypt and Palestine, the report’s conclusion could equally be applied to 
any of the theatres in which the British Army fought during the First World War. This 
article has sought to place the British communications experience on the Western 
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Front with an additional, wider context by examining the army’s communications 
practices in the other, so-called “peripheral,” theatres and asking two significant 
questions: first, how, and to what extent, did British communications practice in the 
“peripheral” theatres differ from that on the Western Front?; and, second, how well 
did the British Army adapt its communications system to meet the diverse array of 
challenges it faced in each of these theatres? 
 With regards to the first question, it is clear that where trench warfare was the 
dominant characteristic of the fighting, such as at Gallipoli and in Macedonia, British 
communications practice bore a very close resemblance to that on the Western Front. 
The static nature of the operations in each of these theatres resulted in the construction 
and maintenance of an equally static communications system, in which telephonic and 
telegraphic communication were the predominant means of conveying information. In 
Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine, and East Africa, however, the less dense force-to-
space ratios, long lines of communication and a relatively lighter concentration of 
enemy artillery resulted in campaigns of greater mobility and manoeuvre, which in 
turn necessitated the use of more flexible means of communication. Wireless, in 
particular, proved to be of much greater relative value in the Middle East and East 
Africa because the natural conditions which prevailed in these theatres were much 
more conducive to its widespread and successful employment than at Gallipoli, in 
Macedonia and, until 1918, on the Western Front. 
 Indeed, to answer the second question posed in this piece, the case of wireless 
serves as a good illustration of how successfully the British Army was able to adapt 
its communications system to suit the diverse array of challenges it faced during the 
First World War. Based solely upon an examination of the British Army’s use of 
wireless on the Western Front, one recent study has argued that it was the “significant 
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institutional bias” of the British high command against wireless communication that 
prevented it being employed both earlier and to its fullest extent.
183
 Such a conclusion 
not only underestimates the scientific and technical limitations of the wireless sets of 
the era for their successful employment on the Western Front but, more specifically, 
fails to take into account the British Army’s global communications experience. As 
this study has demonstrated, officers from this same, supposedly rigid, institution 
were able to employ wireless to great effect in Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine, and 
East Africa. The fact that they were able to do so provides further compelling 
evidence of an institution both willing and able to adapt its communications system to 
meet the challenges of fighting a modern industrial conflict on a global scale. 
 However, while there were notable differences between the communications 
practices employed on the Western Front and in the extra-European theatres, there 
was also a great deal of commonality. That is to say that the signal units in each 
subsidiary theatre conformed to the same set of general principles adhered to by the 
Signal Service on the Western Front. These principles were officially laid down in SS. 
148. Forward Inter-Communication in Battle, the army’s first authoritative 
communications manual published in March 1917.
184
 Based on the lessons learnt from 
the experiences of fighting on the Western Front in 1916, SS. 148 represented British 
communications doctrine in all but name. Copies of the manual and references to it, 
however, can be found littered throughout the war diaries of signal companies in 
every theatre of operations during the war, with the obvious exception of Gallipoli. 
Thus, the evidence presented in this article demonstrates that the British Army did not 
develop its communication practices in one theatre to the exclusion of developments 
elsewhere. There was clear cross-fertilization of best communication methods and 
practices amongst British forces fighting around the globe. In many respects, 
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therefore, the case of communications reveals the extent to which the British Army 
underwent a process of “intra-organizational learning,” one of the key attributes of a 
“learning organization.”185 
Nevertheless, although all British Army signal units from March 1917 were 
effectively “singing from the same hymn sheet,” they proved talented in adapting 
these principles to better suit the conditions of the various theatres in which they were 
fighting. Indeed, British officers in all theatres found that the most flexible and 
efficient communications system was one that utilised a combination of telegraph, 
telephone, wireless, visual signalling and despatch riders, although the order in which 
these methods were ranked in terms of priority varied according to local and regional 
circumstances.
186
 Very often, as Theo Farrell has recently argued, it is this “tinkering” 
of techniques, technologies and procedures to improve operational performance “that 
aids victory in battle and contributes to success in war.”187 Overall, therefore, a 
comparative assessment of British communications practice during the First World 
War provides further evidence to support the argument that the pragmatic nature of 
the British Army and its leadership provided it with a degree of latitude and flexibility 
that, ultimately, enabled it to adapt successfully to the demands of fighting a modern, 
industrialised war on a global scale.
188
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
                                                 
1
 See for example: J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Paul Harris and Sanders Marble, “The ‘Step-by-Step’ Approach: British 
Military Thought and Operational Method on the Western Front, 1915-1917,” War in History 15 
(2008): 17-42; Jonathan Boff, “Combined Arms during the Hundred Days Campaign, August-
November 1918,” War in History 17 (2010): 459-78; Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the 
British Army (London: Aurum Press, 2011); Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: 
The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); and, Jim Beach, “Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917-1918,” 
War in History 19 (2012): 464-91. 
2
 Notable studies in this genre include: Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British 
Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Paddy Griffith, ed., British 
Fighting Methods in the Great War (London: Frank Cass, 1996); J.P. Harris with Niall Barr, Amiens to 
the Armistice: The BEF in the One Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August-11 November 1918 (London: 
Brassey’s, 1998); Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War – Myths and Realities 
(London: Headline, 2001); Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, 1914-18: Defeat 
into Victory (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman, eds., Command and 
Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 
2004); and, Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 
1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006). 
3
 Hew Strachan, “Back to the Trenches: Why Can’t British Historians be Less Insular about the First 
World War?,” The Times Literary Supplement, 5 November 2008; William Philpott, “Beyond the 
‘Learning Curve’: The British Army’s Military Transformation in the First World War,” accessed 20 
February 2013, http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4AF97CF94AC8B/. 
4
 Hew Strachan, The First World War: Vol. 1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), xvi; 
Ian F.W. Beckett, ed., 1917: Beyond the Western Front (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009); Hew 
Strachan, “The First World War as a Global War,” First World War Studies 1 (2010): 3-14. 
5
 David French, “Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932,” The Historical Journal 
44 (2001): 497-515. 
6
 The only published works that focus exclusively on British communications on the Western Front are: 
R.E. Priestley, Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19: The Signal Service 
(France) (Chatham: W. & J. Mackay, 1921); and, Mike Bullock and Laurence A. Lyons, Missed 
Signals on the Western Front: How the Slow Adoption of Wireless Restricted British Strategy and 
Operations in World War I (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2010). The latter, 
however, relies so much on the former for its source material that it offers very little in the way of fresh 
information.   
7
 Jeremy Shapiro, “Information and War: Is it a Revolution?,” in Strategic Appraisal: The Changing 
Role of Information in Warfare, eds., Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White  (Washington, D.C.: 
RAND Corporation, 1999), 113-53. See also the collection of articles in The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 33 (August 2010), Special Issue: The Information Technology Revolution in Military Affairs. 
8
 Emily O. Goldman, ed., Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs (London: Routledge, 2005). 
9
 Jonathan Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare, Occasional 
Papers 22 (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996); Jonathan B.A. Bailey, “The First 
World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare,” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, 
eds., MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 132-
53; and, Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History 
(London: Routledge, 2004), 170-221.  
10
 Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, 120. 
11
 “Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War (The Kirke Report),” October 1932, WO 
32/3116, The National Archives (TNA), London. 
12
 Brian N. Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and Communications on the Western Front, 1914-
1918” (Ph.D. diss., University of Salford, 2009). 
13
 For an examination of the problems that military organisations confront when attempting to adapt in 
war, see Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
14
 Griffith, Battle Tactics, 266. 
15
 This was Brigadier-General Arthur Hildebrand, Deputy Director of Signals, Second Army, whose 
personal diary of the 1914 campaign on the Western Front was published as: “Second Army Signals, 
1914: From the Personal Diary of Brigadier-General A.B.R. Hildebrand,” The Royal Signals Quarterly 
Journal VI (July 1938): 129-41.  
 42 
                                                                                                                                            
16
 R.E. Priestley, The Signal Service in the War 1914 to 1918 (East Africa), n.d., and The Signal 
Service in the War 1914 to 1918 (Salonika), n.d., both unpublished, are available for consultation at the 
archive of the Royal Signals Museum, Blandford, UK. 
17
 Major-General R.F.H. Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals: A History of its Antecedents and 
Development (London: Royal Signals Institution, 1958). 
18
 Michael Muller-Camen, Richard Croucher and Susan Leigh, Human Resource Management: A Case 
Study Approach (London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 2008), 457.  
19
 Margaret Dale, “Learning Organisations,” in Managing Learning, eds. Christopher Mabey and Paul 
Iles (London: Cengage Learning EMEA, 1994), 22.  
20
 Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations (1909) (Reprinted, with Amendments October 1914) 
(London: General Staff, War Office), 22, 39. 
21
 Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and Communications,” 104-11. 
22
 On the history and development of the electric telegraph, see: Irving Fang, A History of Mass 
Communication: Six Information Revolutions (Oxford: Focal Press, 1997), 77-82; Tom Standage, The 
Victorian Internet (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998); and, Laszlo Solymar, Getting the 
Message: A History of Communications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 51-88. 
23
 In a simplex circuit, telegraphic messages could flow in only one direction at a time, whereas duplex 
allowed communication in both directions simultaneously. The high-speed Wheatstone automatic 
apparatus, named after its inventor Sir Charles Wheatstone, allowed for a much faster and intensive 
system of telegraphy than by simple manual operation. See Major W.A.J. O’Meara, “The Various 
Systems of Multiplex Telegraphy,” The Royal Engineers Journal 14 (1911): 353-64; and, Nalder, The 
Royal Corps of Signals, 94.   
24
 Captain R.C. Hammond, “Communication in the Field,” The Royal Engineers Journal 7 (1908): 140. 
25
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 102.  
26
 “Lecture No. 30. Observations at the British Front,” Officers’ School – First Course, Monday, 
January 7
th
, 1918 to Saturday, February 2
nd
, 1918, RG120, Entry 404, Box #2, National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 
27
 Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and Communications,” 169, 181-2. 
28
 For the reasons why, see Brian N. Hall, “The ‘Life-Blood’ of Command? The British Army, 
Communications and the Telephone, 1877-1914,” War & Society 27 (2008): 43-65. 
29
 Wyn Griffith, Up to Mametz (first published 1931; new ed., London: Severn House, 1981), 185. 
30
 For which purpose a key was provided. See Instruction in Army Telegraphy and Telephony: Vol. 1 – 
Instruments (London: HMSO, 1914), 166-8. 
31
 Colonel R.M. Powell, “Divisional Signals in 1914,” The Royal Signals Quarterly Journal 7 (1940): 
340.  
32
 GHQ to War Office, 30 September 1914, WO 33/713, TNA. 
33
 Magneto telephones incorporated a small hand generator to supply the current used to contact the 
switchboard operator. John William Henry Boon, Interview (1986), 009476/1, Department of Sound 
Records, Imperial War Museum (IWM), London. 
34
 T.F. Purves, “Trench Telephones,” The Post Office Electrical Engineers’ Journal 8 (1915-16): 95. 
35
 “Lessons From the Recent Operations of the XVIII Corps,” 16 May 1918, Notes on British 
Operations, April-October 1918, WO 158/406, TNA.  
36
 John Bray, The Communications Miracle: The Telecommunication Pioneers from Morse to the 
Information Superhighway (London: Plenum Press, 1995), 5. 
37
 “A Signaller in France 1914-1918,” 27, Captain J.C. Craven Papers, 92.1 CRAVEN, Royal 
Engineers Museum Archive (REMA), Gillingham, Kent. 
38
 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, 1914-18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 44-73.  
39
 ‘Report on the Operations of the IVth Army Corps from 10th to 15th March, 1915’, undated, WO 
158/374, TNA.  
40
 “Notes on Communications During Recent Operations,” 15 August 1916, X Corps Signal Company 
War Diary, WO 95/875, TNA. 
41
 Ian Poole, Newnes Guide to Radio and Communications Technology (Oxford: Newnes, 2003); Bray, 
The Communications Miracle, 67; Solymar, Getting the Message, 130. 
42
 Peter J. Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 141-54. 
43
 Dean Juniper, “The First World War and Radio Development,” Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute 148 (2003): 84.  
 43 
                                                                                                                                            
44
 For additional context on the development of wireless within the British Army both before and 
during the First World War, see Brian N. Hall, “The British Army and Wireless Communication, 1896-
1918,” War in History 19 (2012): 290-321. 
45
 “Wireless Memories Round About the First World War” (1958), 6, Raymond Priestley Papers, GS 
1303, Liddle Collection, Brotherton Library, University of Leeds (LCL). 
46
 Colonel R.S. Curtis, “The Work of Signal Units in War,” The Royal Engineers Journal XVIII 
(1913): 273-4; “Report of Conference on Personnel and Training of Wireless Units. 1914,” 15 June 
1914, 3, WO 33/3076, TNA. 
47
 Hall, “The British Army and Wireless Communication:” 301-2 
48
 SS. 148.  Forward Inter-Communication in Battle (March 1917), 22; Signal Service (France). 
Technical Instructions No. 1. W/T Sets, Forward, Spark, 20 Watts, B., Front and Rear (“Loop” Set) 
(May 1917); Brigadier H.E. Hopthrow, “The Use of Wireless Telegraphy by the Royal Engineers in the 
1914-18 War,” The Royal Engineers Historical Society, Occasional Paper No. 2 (May 1983): 10. 
49
 Captain B.F.J. Schonland, “W/T. R.E.: An Account of the Work and Development of Field Wireless 
Sets with the Armies in France,” The Wireless World 7 (1919): 178.  
50
 Bray, Communications Miracle, 67; Solymar, Getting the Message, 153; Nalder, The Royal Corps of 
Signals, 123; Schonland, “W/T. R.E.:” 396-7. 
51
 “Operations. Amiens (Report on Wireless Communications) 8-8-18 to 22-8-18. Cdn. Corps Heavy 
Artillery,” 29 August 1918, Vol. 3923, Folder 10, File 6, RG9-III-C-1, Library and Archives Canada 
(LAC), Ottawa.  
52
 Dennis E. Showalter, “Mass Warfare and the Impact of Technology,” in Great War, Total War: 
Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds., Roger Chickering and Stig Förster 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 86.  
53
 Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and Communications,” 309.  
54
 Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, Vol. IV 
(London: HMSO, 1947), 478.  
55
 For the British official history, see Brigadier-General C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations, 
Gallipoli, 2 Vols. (London: Heinemann, 1929 and 1932). 
56
 Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli (London: Macmillan, 1994); John Lee, A Soldier’s 
Life: General Sir Ian Hamilton 1853-1947 (London: Macmillan, 2000); Edward J. Erickson, “Strength 
Against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915,” Journal of Military History 65 
(2001): 981-1011; Tim Travers, Gallipoli 1915 (London: Tempus, 2004); Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The 
End of the Myth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).  
57
 Most notably in Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War 
(London: Vintage Books, 1990), 159-60. 
58
 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (London: HMSO, 1913), General Sir Ian 
Hamilton Papers, 7/4/2, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London (LHCMA). 
On the inability of the British Army and Royal Navy to resolve problems relating to integrated 
planning and unified command before the war, see Jim Beach, “The British Army, the Royal Navy, and 
the ‘Big Work’ of Sir George Aston, 1904-1914,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (2006): 145-68. 
59
 General Sir Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 1 (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), 118, 127. 
60
 Following the Gallipoli campaign, Bowman-Manifold served the remainder of the war as Director of 
Army Signals, Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF). See Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and 
Communications,” 364.  
61
 Signal Organization for Combined Operations (1915), Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 
95/4268, TNA. 
62
 “Orders for Naval Signal Parties Landed with Military,” 12 April 1915, “G.H.Q./R.A., 2. Directions 
Concerning ‘Observation Officers’ for Observing Fire of H.M. Ships in Combined Operations,” 14 
April 1915, Hamilton Papers, 7/4/18-19, LHCMA. 
63
 “Operation Order No. 1. Appendix III: Instructions for Inter-Communication,” 17 April 1915, “29th 
Division Operation Order No. 1,” 20 April 1915, Australia and New Zealand Army Corps War Diary, 
1/25/1, Australian War Memorial (AWM). 
64
 Director of Army Signals War Diary, 25 April 1915, WO 95/4268, TNA. 
65
 Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, 146. 
66
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 158. 
67
 See “Lessons of the Great War Committee. Military Operations – Gallipoli – Vols. I and II. Report 
by Lieutenant-General W.M. Kirke,” May 1932, General Sir Walter Kirke Papers, 4/11, LHCMA. 
 44 
                                                                                                                                            
68
 “Landing of Australian and New Zealand Army at Gabe Tepe in Gallipoli Peninsula,” n.d., General 
Cunliffe Owen Papers, CAB 45/246, TNA.  
69
 General Hamilton remained separate from his GHQ staff on board H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth. See 
Travers, Gallipoli 1915, 302-6. 
70
 “Signals – Gallipoli (Furnished by Major H.C.B. Wemyss, DSO., MC., R.Signals),” n.d., 2, CAB 
45/230, TNA; New Zealand and Australian Division Signal Company War Diary, 30 April 1915, 
22/15A/1, AWM. 
71
 French, “Doctrine and Organization:” 514. 
72
 “A Series of Letters from Lieut. P.W. Turner, R.E. Signal Service: 5 December 1915,” The Post 
Office Electrical Engineers’ Journal XI (1918-19): 45. 
73
 “Signals – Gallipoli,” 5, CAB 45/230, TNA. 
74
 “My Narrative of the Great German War, Vol. 1,” (1919), 81, Lieutenant-General Sir Beauvoir de 
Lisle Papers, 3/1, LHCMA.  
75
 Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, 345. 
76
 On the significant parallels that existed between the Gallipoli and the Western Front theatres, see 
Travers, Gallipoli, 310-11.  
77
 “Signals – Gallipoli,” 4-5, CAB 45/230, TNA. 
78
 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 163; Travers, Gallipoli, 310-11. 
79
 “Signals – Gallipoli,” 6; “Narrative of Signal Work (GHQ & 9th Corps) for Operations 6th-7th August, 
1915,” Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4268, TNA. 
80
 Director of Army Signals War Diary, 6-9 August 1915, WO 95/4268; 10 Division War Diary, 6 
August 1915, WO 95/4294; Arthur E. Beecroft (11
th
 Division Signal Company) to General Aspinall-
Oglander, 9 February 1931, CAB 45/241, TNA. 
81
 “Lessons of the Great War Committee,” Kirke Papers, 4/11, LHCMA. 
82
 Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 2, 58. 
83
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 161. 
84
 Tim Travers has labelled this British command practice as “HQitis.” See Travers, Gallipoli, 172. See 
also: Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 163; and, Prior, Gallipoli, 245.  
85
 24 March 1918, “Private Diary of Major-General C.E. Pereira, Vol. III, 1917 & 1918,” 2 Division 
War Diary, WO 95/1289, TNA; Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Yule, “Signals with Carey’s Force: An 
Episode of the March Retreat, 1918,” The Royal Signals Quarterly Journal V (July 1937): 158. 
86
 “Signals – Gallipoli,” 8-9, CAB 45/230, TNA. 
87
 “Report by Major Bidder R.E. Officer i/c Signals 9th Corps on the Signal Arrangements for the 
Evacuation of SUVLA,” 11 July 1916, CAB 45/225, TNA. 
88
 See, for example, Kaushik Roy, “From Defeat to Victory: Logistics of the Campaign in 
Mesopotamia 1914-1918,” First World War Studies 1 (2010): 35-55. 
89
 For the British official history, see Brigadier-General F.J. Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia 
1914-1918, 3 Vols. (London: HMSO, 1923-25). Though it mentions communications sparingly, the 
best modern account of the campaign is Charles Townshend, When God Made Hell: The British 
Invasion of Mesopotamia and the Creation of Iraq 1914-1921 (London: Faber and Faber, 2010). For 
signals intelligence, see: Peter Morris, “Intelligence and its Interpretation: Mesopotamia 1914-1916,” 
in Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945, eds., Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1987), 77-102; and, Richard Popplewell, “British Intelligence in 
Mesopotamia 1914-16,” Intelligence and National Security 5 (April 1990): 139-72. 
90
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 191-3. 
91
 “A Series of Letters from Lieut. P.W. Turner – 11 November 1916,” 51. 
92
 “Statement of Military Signals and Telegraphs on the 30th July 1915,” Director of Signals War Diary, 
WO 95/4984, TNA. 
93
 “0/624, with Reference to Operation Order No. 2,” 7 January 1917, GHQ Mesopotamia War Diary, 
WO 95/4966, TNA. 
94
 E.S. Humphries Interview with Peter Liddle, April 1972, E.S. Humphries Papers, MES 050, LCL. 
95
 Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, 113-14. 
96
 Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 2, 442. 
97
 Captain H.S. Cardew, cited in Townshend, When God Made Hell, 157. 
98
 “Wireless Memories Round About the First World War” (1958), 6, Raymond Priestley Papers, GS 
1303, LCL.  
99
 R.H. Dewing, “Some Aspects of Maude’s Campaign in Mesopotamia. No. 2. Cavalry,” The Army 
Quarterly XIV (April 1927): 73-5.  
 45 
                                                                                                                                            
100
 “Report of No. 7 Wireless Station Attached 7th CAVALRY BRIGADE Period 1st October to 29th 
November 1918 during Operations on MOSUL;” “Report on No. 8 Wireless Station from 1st October 
1918 to 18
th
 January 1919,” 1st Australian Wireless Signal Squadron War Diary, 22/16/12, AWM. 
101
 Popplewell, “British Intelligence,” 147. 
102
 “A Series of Letters from Lieut. P.W. Turner – 15 June 1916,” 49. 
103
 Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Queripel (Director of Army Signals and Telegraphs) to his wife (Sybil), 
16 March 1917, Colonel L.H. Queripel Papers, 1/1, LHCMA. 
104
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 191. 
105
 Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, 291. 
106
 “A Series of Letters by Lieut. P.W. Turner – 7 September 1916,” 50. 
107
 Captain H.J. Blampied, With a Highland Regiment in Mesopotamia 1916-1917, by One of its 
Officers (Bombay: The Times Press, 1918), 78-9. See also Lieutenant-Colonel A.H. Burne, D.S.O, 
Mesopotamia: The Last Phase (London: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1938), 11-14. 
108
 13 Division Signal Company War Diary, 5 April 1916, WO 95/5152, TNA. 
109
 Andrew Syk, “Command in the Indian Expeditionary Force D: Mesopotamia, 1915-16,” in The 
Indian Army in the Two World Wars, ed. Kaushik Roy (Boston: Brill Academic, 2011), 94-5. 
110
 Nikolas Gardner, “Charles Townshend’s Advance on Baghdad: The British Offensive in 
Mesopotamia, September-November 1915,” War in History 20 (2013): 192-3. 
111
 Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, 325; Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 
Vol. 2, 206; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 127. 
112
 For an appraisal of the work carried out by the Signal Service, see “General Headquarters. 
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force. Despatch on Operations from 28
th
 August 1916, to 31
st
 March 
1917,” 10 April 1917, Queripel Papers, 1/1, LHCMA.  
113
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 200. 
114
 For the British official history, see Captain Cyril Falls, Military Operations. Egypt and Palestine, 2 
Vols. (London: HMSO, 1922 and 1930). 
115
 Matthew Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East 1917-1919 (London: Frank Cass, 
1999); Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1998); Yigal Sheffy, “Chemical Warfare and the Palestine Campaign, 1916-1918,” 
Journal of Military History 73 (2009): 803-44. 
116
 “Notes on the Signal Communications of the Force,” 27 December 1916, Western Force Signal 
Company War Diary, WO 95/4443, TNA. 
117
 “10th Division Signal Communications,” 16 September 1918, 10 Division Signal Company War 
Diary, WO 95/4574, TNA. 
118
 “Plans and Orders for Operations Resulting in Capture of Tul Keram. September 19th 1918. Secret 
Instruction No. 3. Co-operation with R.A.F.,” 14 September 1918, General Sir John Shea Papers, 4/4, 
LHCMA. 
119
 “Desert Mounted Corps. Communications,” 12 September 1918, Desert Mounted Corps War Diary, 
1/62/6, AWM. 
120
 “Major-General A. Lynden-Bell (CGS, Egyptian Expeditionary Force) to Western Frontier Force,” 
3 May 1916, Director of Signals War Diary, WO 95/4387; “54th Divisional Instruction No. 4. 
Communications,” 11 September 1918, 54 Division Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4645, TNA. 
121
 Lieutenant-Colonel The Hon. R.M.P. Preston D.S.O., The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account of the 
Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria 1917-1918 (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1921), 57. 
122
 Yigal Sheffy, “Institutionalised Deception and Perception Reinforcement: Allenby’s Campaigns in 
Palestine,” Intelligence and National Security 5 (April 1990): 202; Sheffy, British Military Intelligence, 
255. 
123
 “Report on Wireless Test between a Wagon Wireless Station and a Pack Wireless Station, Carried 
out between May 30
th
 and June 9
th, 1916,” Western Force Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4443, 
TNA.  
124
 “Report on Signal Communications – 3rd Battle of Gaza,” 24 November 1917, 54 Division Signal 
Company War Diary, WO 95/4645, TNA. 
125
 “Operations on 18th, 19th and 20th September, 1918,” 26 September 1918, 54 Division Signal 
Company War Diary, WO 95/4645, TNA. 
126
 “Notes on Signal Communications in Recent Operations of the 60th Division,” 17 November 1917, 
60 Division Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4664, TNA. It should be noted that 60
th
 Division had 
spent July-October 1916 in the Arras sector on the Western Front. 
127
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 177-85. 
 46 
                                                                                                                                            
128
 “General Notes on Communications Between September 19th and 24th,” 30 September 1918, XX 
Corps Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4487, TNA. 
129
 “Minutes of the Commander-in-Chief’s Conference, 17th September, 1917,” GHQ Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force War Diary, WO 95/4368, TNA. 
130
 On the poling of lines, see “Summary of Some Notes on Operations,” 2 October 1917, General Sir 
William Bartholomew Papers, 1/3/2, LHCMA. For cable burying, see “Buried Cable Scheme,” 12 
September 1917, 75 Division Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4685, TNA.  
131
 “Director of Army Signals, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Circular Memorandum No. 32,” 5 May 
1917, Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4387; “Report on Signal Communications During 
Operations Before Gaza, March 26
th
 and 27
th
 1917,” 11 April 1917, GHQ Signal Company War Diary, 
WO 95/4408, TNA. 
132
 See Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and Communications,” Ch. 6. 
133
 “Major M.E. Webb to G.O.C. 10th Division,” 14 August 1918, 10 Division Signal Company War 
Diary, WO 95/4574, TNA. 
134
 “Notes on the Fighting in Palestine Issued to 60th Div. Experience Gained in the Recent Fighting,” 
14 February 1918, Shea Papers, 4/3, LHCMA. 
135
 “Director of Army Signals, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Circular Memorandum No. 26,” 6 
February 1917, Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4387, TNA. 
136
 “Report on Signal Communications During Operations Before Gaza, March 26th and 27th 1917,” 11 
April 1917, GHQ Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4408, TNA. 
137
 See, for example, “52nd Divisional (GS) Circular Memorandum No. 53,” 7 January 1918, 52 
Division War Diary, WO 95/4598, TNA. I am grateful to Dr Chris Forrest for drawing my attention to 
this memorandum. 
138
 “Special Instructions – Signal Communications,” 9 April 1917, Major-General Guy Dawnay Papers, 
69/21/2, Department of Documents, IWM; “Special Instructions for Visual Signallers and Telephonists 
in Egypt,” 7 March 1917, Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4387; “54th Division. Visual 
Scheme,” 11 January 1918, 54 Division Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4645, TNA. 
139
 “Notes on Pigeon Service,” 29 March 1918, GHQ Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4408, TNA.  
140
 “Notes on Signal Communications in Recent Operations of the 60th Division,” 17 November 1917, 
60 Division Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/4664, TNA. 
141
 Falls, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, Vol. 2, 169; John Bourne, “British Generals in the 
First World War,” in Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience Since 1861, ed., 
G.D. Sheffield (London: Brassey’s, 2002), 93-116. 
142
 Ross Anderson, “The Battle of Tanga, 2-5 November 1914,” War in History 8 (2001): 294-322; 
Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ross 
Anderson, The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914-1918 (Stroud: Tempus, 2004); 
Edward Paice, Tip & Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 2007). 
143
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 206. 
144
 Brigadier-General J.J. Collyer (Chief-of-Staff to General Jan Smuts), quoted in Strachan, The First 
World War in Africa, 136. 
145
 “Report on Nigerian Brigade Signallers by Capt. Williams, Nigerian Brigade Signalling Officer,” 17 
February 1917, Deputy Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/5303, TNA. 
146
 “Letter from DDAS to GSO,” 27 March 1916, Deputy Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 
95/5303, TNA. 
147
 Phillip Parotti, “War in the Tropics: East Africa and Burma,” in The Great World War 1914-45, Vol. 
1: Lightning Strikes Twice, eds. John Bourne, Peter Liddle and Ian Whitehead (London: HarperCollins, 
2000), 168. 
148
 “General Notes for November 1916,” Deputy Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/5303, 
TNA. 
149
 “Report on Army Signal Service, 1st July 1916,” Deputy Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 
95/5304, TNA.  
150
 Strachan, The First World War in Africa, 125. 
151
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 202. 
152
 “Report on Army Signal Service, 1st July 1916,” Deputy Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 
95/5304, TNA.  
153
 W. Whittall, With Botha and Smuts in Africa (London: Cassell and Company, 1917), 183. 
154
 Brigadier-General C.P. Fendall, The East African Force 1915-1919 (London: H. F. & C. Witherby, 
1921), 116. 
 47 
                                                                                                                                            
155
 General von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa (London: Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., 
1920), 284. 
156
 Ibid., 82, 284-5; Brigadier-General S.H. Sheppard, “Some Notes on Tactics in the East African 
Campaign,” The Journal of the United Service Institution of India XLVIII (April 1919): 142-3. 
157
 “Statement of Line Faults During the Month of February 1916,” Deputy Director of Army Signals 
War Diary, WO 95/5303, TNA.  
158
 Brigadier-General R.T. Ridgway, “With No. 2 Column. German East Africa, 1917,” The Army 
Quarterly V (October 1922): 25. 
159
 “Report on Communications at Action of Salaita Hill on 12.2.16,” 2 East African Division Signal 
Company War Diary, WO 95/5344, TNA. 
160
 “Memorandum from D.D.A.S. to B.S.O. 1st South African Mounted Brigade,” 26 March 1916, 
Deputy Director of Signals War Diary, WO 95/5303, TNA. 
161
 East Africa Wireless Signal Company War Diary, 27-28 August 1917, WO 95/5316, TNA; Major 
W. Rathbone Diary, 4 November 1915, P.181, IWM. 
162
 Frank L. Musto (King’s African Rifles), Interview (1984), 008288/1-2, Department of Sound 
Records, IWM.  
163
 “Letter from O.C. Wireless Signal Company to Deputy Dir. Army Signals, Dar-es-Salaam,” 18 
January 1918, East Africa Wireless Signal Company War Diary, WO 95/95/5316, TNA. 
164
 For the British official history, see Captain Cyril Falls, Military Operations. Macedonia, 2 Vols. 
(London: HMSO, 1933 and 1935). The best modern account of the campaign is Alan Wakefield and 
Simon Moody, Under the Devil’s Eye: Britain’s Forgotten Army at Salonika 1915-1918 (Stroud: 
Sutton Publishing, 2004). 
165
 For a concise overview of Allied-Greek relations during the war, see R.J. Crampton, “The Balkans, 
1914-1918,” in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, ed. Hew Strachan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 68-76. 
166
 “Signals in Salonika, 1915-1918 by Brigadier G.G. Rawson,” May 1937, 2-5, CAB 45/2, TNA. 
167
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 170. 
168
 “Signals in Salonika, 1915-1918 by Brigadier G.G. Rawson,” May 1937, 6, CAB 45/2, TNA. 
169
 “January 1917 General Remarks,” Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4783, TNA. 
170
 “January 1918 General Remarks;” “Director of Army Signals. Circular Memorandum No. 22,” 5 
January 1918; “Notes for Conference to be Held in the D.A.S. Office at 11.30 am on Friday 12 th April 
1918,” 11 April 1918, Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4984, TNA. 
171
 “Signals in Salonika, 1915-1918 by Brigadier G.G. Rawson,” May 1937, 3, CAB 45/2, TNA. 
172
 “November 1916 General Remarks,” Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4783, TNA. 
173
 “August 1916 General Remarks,” Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4783, TNA. 
174
 “Signals in Salonika, 1915-1918 by Brigadier G.G. Rawson,” May 1937, 8, CAB 45/2, TNA.  
175
 Nalder, The Royal Corps of Signals, 169. 
176
 “Notes on the Work of the G.H.Q. and L. of C. Signal Companies During September 1917,” 3 
October 1917, Director of Army Signals War Diary, WO 95/4783, TNA. 
177
 Captain C.C.S. White, “An Unofficial History of the Signal Service with the British Salonika Force, 
1915-18,” The Royal Engineers Journal XL (December 1926): 652-53. 
178
 Wakefield and Moody, Under the Devil’s Eye, 97. 
179
 “Signals in Salonika, 1915-1918 by Brigadier G.G. Rawson,” May 1937, 13-15, CAB 45/2, TNA. 
180
 Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and Communications,” Ch. 6. 
181
 White, “An Unofficial History,” 656; Director of Army Signals War Diary, 16-21 February 1918, 
WO 95/4984; “Signals in Salonika, 1915-1918 by Brigadier G.G. Rawson,” May 1937, 15, CAB 45/2, 
TNA. 
182
 A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under the Command of General 
Sir Edmund H.H. Allenby, July 1917 to October 1918, Compiled from Official Sources (London: 
HMSO, 1919), 86. 
183
 Bullock and Lyons, Missed Signals on the Western Front, 192-4. 
184
 SS. 148. Forward Inter-Communication in Battle (March 1917). In light of further experience, the 
manual was modified slightly and re-issued as SS. 191. Intercommunication in the Field (November 
1917). See Hall, “The British Expeditionary Force and Communications,” 223-6. For more detail on 
the British Army’s training manuals, see Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, 179-86; and, 
Beach, “Issued by the General Staff.” 
185
 Mark Easterby-Smith, John Burgoyne and Luis Araujo, eds., Organizational Learning and Learning 
Organizations: Developments in Theory and Practice (London: SAGE, 1999). On the specific issue of 
 48 
                                                                                                                                            
intra-organizational learning and the problems involved in internal-knowledge transfer, see Gabriel 
Szulanski, Sticky Knowledge: Barriers to Knowing in the Firm (London: SAGE, 2003).  
186
 Despite the addition of wireless telephony, British commanders during the Second World War also 
found that the best communications system was one that utilized a combination of lines, wireless and 
despatch riders. See Simon Godfrey, “Command and Communications in the British Army in Europe 
and North Africa c.1919-1945,” (Ph.D. diss., University College London, 2009), 337-8. 
187
 Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan, 2006-2009,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 33 (2010): 568. 
188
 On the role played by the inherently pragmatic nature of the British officer corps to the successful 
conduct of operations on the Western Front, see Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western 
Front 1914-1919 (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1998), 231-40. 
 
 
